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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
to interpretation of that Constitution."" State legislatures and school systems
should take to heart this subtle admonition to consider the obvious wisdom of
adoption of such procedural safeguards. Although application of the fourteenth
amendment is limited to cases in which interests of life, liberty, or property are
involved, we have progressed beyond an era in which such interests can be
narrowly construed to exclude a person's interest in his means of livelihood
just because it is not a precisely defined constitutional right. Rather than dis-
tort the meaning of fourteenth amendment concepts, states should act to pro-
vide suitable protections for the people they employ. A statement of reasons
for dismissal and an opportunity to rebut them at an open hearing constitutes
no grievous burden on state schools. Indeed, providing such procedural safe-
guards accords with the very spirit of our law."'
Nathan L. Hecht
Right to Counsel: A New Standard
The indigent petitioner was charged in Florida with carrying a concealed
weapon, a misdemeanor offense punishable by a fine not exceeding $500 or
imprisonment for not more than six months.' The petitioner was not repre-
sented by counsel. He was found guilty and sentenced to pay a $500 fine or
serve ninety days in jail. While imprisoned, he sought a writ of habeas corpus,
asserting that he was unable to defend himself properly at trial since he was
deprived of his right to court-appointed counsel. The Florida Supreme Court
denied the writ,' and the Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari.' Held, reversed: Absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person
may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as a petty crime, a
misdemeanor, or a felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Although Parliament gave a defendant accused of treason the right to court-
appointed counsel in 1695,' it was not until 1903 that this same right was pro-
vided in all felony cases involving an indigent defendant! In the United States,
the right to appointed counsel was first established in Powell v. Alabama,'
in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the right existed
66408 U.S. at 578-79.
67 "Doth our law judge any man before it hear him, and know what he doeth?" John
7:51.
'FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.01 (1965).
'State ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970). The court stated that
an indigent's right to court-appointed counsel extended only to trials "for non-petty offenses
punishable by more than six months imprisonment." Id. at 443.
8401 U.S. 908 (1971).
47 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3, § 1 (1695).
53 Edw. 7, c. 38, § 1 (1903).6287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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for indigents accused in federal courts of capital offenses.! The right was later
extended to all indigent defendants in felony cases tried in federal courts.8
Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Betts v. Brady' held that the failure to
appoint counsel in a non-capital state felony trial was not a denial of due
process. In 1963, however, the Supreme Court, in Gideon v. Wainwright,"°
held that the sixth amendment right to counsel was incorporated in the four-
teenth amendment due process clause. Although the petitioner in Gideon was
accused of a felony, the opinion was devoid of any specific limitation to felony
defendants, and was framed consistently in terms of the rights of persons
"charged with crime."'" It was not until 1967 that the Court specifically limited
its holding in Gideon to indigents accused of felonies."
A sharp division existed among the courts' as to whether Gideon should
be interpreted narrowly,' or whether the broad language of the opinion was
an invitation to extend the right to court-appointed counsel to indigent de-
fendants in virtually all prosecutions." Most courts, however, occupied posi-
tions between these two extremes, " and extended the right to counsel to the
extent allowed by various standards which had developed in their respective
jurisdictions.' Gideon did not provide a unifying rule of law among the juris-
7 The Court acknowledged the fact that its limitation of the right to appointed counsel
to capital offenses was much more narrow than the treatment of the right in most states at
the time, but declined to extend its holding beyond the facts of the case. Id. at 73.
8 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Justice Black did not specifically limit the
holding to felony cases, but wrote in terms of the sixth amendment withholding from fed-
eral courts "in all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of
his life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel." Id. at 463.
8 316 U.S. 455 (1942). The decision has generally been considered to have been a re-
gression in the Court's gradual extension of the right to court-appointed counsel. See, e.g.,
Allison & Phelps, Can We Afford To Provide Trial Counsel for the Indigent in Misde-
meanor Cases?, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 76 (1971).
10372 U.S. 335 (1963).
" Id. at 344. Justice Black, writing for the Court, referred to the importance of counsel
in the American criminal justice system, without referring only to those accused of a felony.
See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932):
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and edu-
cated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged
with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether
the indictment is good or bad.
In Powell, however, the Court did go on to limit its decision specifically to the existence of
the right to counsel in capital cases.
"2 "In Gideon v. Wainwright ...this Court held ...that there was an absolute right
to the appointment of counsel in felony cases." Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).
" For definitive treatment of the development of the expanded right to court-appointed
counsel for misdemeanants in state and lower federal courts, see Allison & Phelps, supra
note 9; Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty
States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 103 (1970).4 See, e.g., Cortinez v. Flournoy, 249 La. 741, 190 So. 2d 909 (1966); City of Toledo
v. Frazier, 10 Ohio App. 2d 51, 226 N.E.2d 777 (1967).
"2 Courts which extended the right to court-appointed counsel to its full dimension have
relied on language in Gideon which refers to "crime" and to "any person hauled into court
who is too poor to hire a lawyer" to support their conclusion that the right should be ex-
tended to all defendants in any criminal proceeding. See, e.g., City of Tacoma v. Heater, 67
Wash. 2d 736, 409 P.2d 867 (1966); People v. Letterio, 16 N.Y.2d 307, 213 N.E.2d 670,
266 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1965).
1Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REV. 685, 719
(1968).
" Basically, there appear to be two general standards which have found application in
these jurisdictions: the serious offense standard and the petty offense standard. The serious
offense standard was employed in one of two general forms. Some courts merely defined the
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dictions, and without any authoritative statement of the post-Gideon standard
from the Supreme Court,18 the courts were relatively free to develop their own
standards. The resulting confusion often made the indigent misdemeanant's
right to counsel dependent on the forum of the trial.
II. ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN
In Argersinger v. Hamlin the United States Supreme Court clarified the
constitutional limitation on the right to court-appointed counsel, and eliminated
to a great degree the diverse practices in the lower courts. The Court specific-
ally rejected the petty offense standard which had been applied by the Florida
Supreme Court, and applied instead an adaptation of the serious offense stan-
dard. " The only consideration to be employed in determining the seriousness
of the offense was held to be the likelihood of imprisonment upon conviction.
As if in answer to the confusion prompted by Gideon, the Court was care-
ful to limit its holding specifically to situations involving the loss of liberty."
The Court pointed out that the reasoning of cases such as Duncan v.
Louisiana,"' limiting the right to trial by jury to non-petty offenses, was in-
applicable in ascertaining the extent of the right to court-appointed counsel.
The two rights, said the Court, are of different genealogy: the limitation of
the right to jury trial to more serious criminal cases is supported in the his-
tory of criminal law,' while there is no historical support for such a limitation
on the right to counsel. Referring to the fact that the right to retain counsel
was extended to misdemeanants and not to felons under the rule of the English
common law," the Court reasoned that the sixth amendment had the effect of
offense in terms of maximum possible punishment. See, e.g., Harvey v. State, 340 F.2d 263,
270-71 (5th Cir. 1965); Marston v. Oliver, 324 F. Supp. 691 (E.D. Va. 1971); Brinson
v. Florida, 273 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1967). Other courts examined several factors, in
addition to maximum possible punishment, in order to determine whether the seriousness
of the crime demanded a right to counsel. See, e.g., Alvis v. Kimbrough, 446 F.2d 548
(5th Cir. 1971); Brinson v. State, 273 F. Supp. 840, 843 (S.D. Fla. 1967); State v. An-
derson, 96 Ariz. 123, 392 P.2d 784, 790 (1964); People v. Dupree, 42 Ill. 2d 249, 246
N.E.2d 281, 285 (1969).
Those jurisdictions employing the petty offense standard generally followed the federal
definition of petty offense contained in the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 1(3)
(1970): "Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for a
period of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both." These jurisdictions justified
the application of the petty offense standard to the right to counsel because this was the
standard set forth by the Court in determining the extent of the right to trial by jury in
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). See, e.g., Beck v. Winters, 407 F.2d 125,
128-29 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 963 (1969); Roberts v. Janco, 335 F. Supp. 942,
945-46 (N.D.W. Va. 1971).
" After the Gideon decision, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in at least three cases
involving a denial of counsel to indigents in misdemeanor cases. Heller v. Connecticut, 389
U.S. 902 (1967); DeJoseph v. Connecticut, 385 U.S. 982 (1966); Winters v. Beck, 385
U.S. 907 (1966). Justice Stewart dissented in both the DeJoseph and Winters cases. In
DeJoseph he made reference to those jurisdictions which allowed court.appointed counsel
for indigent misdemeanants, and stated: "When the meaning of a fundamental constitution-
al right depends on which court . . . a person turns to for redress, I believe it is time for
this Court to intervene." 385 U.S. at 983.
" See note 17 supra.
20407 U.S. at 37.
25391 U.S. 145 (1968).
2 See Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guarantee
of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REv. 917, 980-82 (1926).
231 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 341 (1883). A defendant
charged with a felony was not permitted to retain counsel until 1836. W. BEANEY, THE
extending the right to counsel beyond its common-law dimensions, and that
there was nothing in the Constitution to indicate that the right did not extend
to petty offenses.
Support for the extension of the right to court-appointed counsel was found
in the assertion that the presence of counsel is a necessary element in a fair
trial.' The Court reasoned that the legal and constitutional issues involved in
any case that results in imprisonment are just as complex, regardless of the
term of imprisonment. Further, the Court based its decision on the volume of
misdemeanor cases in the criminal courts. 5 Because of the vast quantity, there
may be a desire for speedy dispositions, often at the expense of fundamental
fairness." Denouncing such "assembly-line justice," and the problems of
potential prejudice resulting to misdemeanor and petty offenders, the Court
concluded that the presence of counsel should be required to insure the ac-
cused a fair trial; but the Court limited that requirement, not to situations
in which it is legally possible to imprison a defendant, but to situations in
which the defendant would actually suffer imprisonment if convicted. The
Court did not attempt to instruct the states on how to implement the direc-
tives of Argersinger; it did, however, indicate that to alleviate potential
problems, some minor offenses could be removed from the court system and
handled administratively."
III. THE ARGERSINGER STANDARD-WILL IT WORK?
Under the new standard, the right to appointed counsel exists in all cases in
which the judge intends to imprison the defendant if convicted." There are
two methods available to courts for implementing this standard; both, how-
ever, are subject to valid criticisms" which indicate that implementation could
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 9 (1955); 2 L. PIKE, A HISTORY OF CRIME
IN ENGLAND 444 (1968).
24407 U.S. at 33-34.
"Some courts have used the existence of a great number of cases coming before the
courts as a reason for denying the extension of the right to counsel and other rights. See,
e.g., Bentley v. United States, 431 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1970); Hendrix v. Seattle, 456 P.2d
696 (Wash. 1969).
21407 U.S. at 34-37. The Court cited a study which concluded that "[Mlisdemeanants
represented by attorneys are five times as likely to emerge from police court with all charges
dismissed as are defendants who face similar charges without counsel." A.C.L.U., LEGAL
COUNSEL FOR MISDEMEANANTS, PRELIMINARY REPORT 1 (1970).
27 407 U.S. at 38 n.9. The Court stressed that this solution is peculiarly within the pro-
vince of legislative bodies.
"8 "Under the rule we announce today, every judge will know when the trial of a mis-
demeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits it,
unless the accused is represented by counsel. He will have a measure of the seriousness and
gravity of the offense and therefore know when to name a lawyer to represent the accused
before the trial starts." Id. at 40.
2" One method is judicial determination of the likelihood of imprisonment before trial.
Although this is the more narrow formula, how could such a judicial determination be
made? Unless the judge examines evidentiary material before trial, he cannot always be cer-
tain that he would or would not impose imprisonment. But if he does examine evidentiary
material prior to trial, he runs the risk of prejudicing the case. Junker, supra note 16, at
710. In his concurring opinion in Argersinger, Mr. Justice Powell pointed out that there
are equal protection problems raised by the use of this method. It would result in some
courts allowing counsel for a particular offense, while in other courts, an indigent could be
denied the right for the same type of offense. Also, if punishment in the alternative is pro-
vided legislatively, and the judge predetermined that he will not impose imprisonment, the
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better be effected legislatively. Quite apart from the question of whether im-
plementation of the Argersinger standard should be accomplished judicially
or legislatively, cost and manpower implications arise from the standard itself.
There are three fundamental questions posed by the adoption and effective
implementation of the new standard." First, how many lawyers will be re-
quired? Second, is the supply of lawyers adequate to meet the increased de-
mand for legal services? And third, how much will it cost?
It is estimated that in order to defend adequately all indigent persons who
will qualify for appointed counsel under Argersinger the full-time services of
2,300 to 5,600 lawyers will be required. 1 This represents an increase of 1,250
to 4,200 full-time lawyers over those required for indigent felony defense
under the Gideon standard.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in writing the opinion of the Court, did not deal ex-
tensively with the problem of whether there will be a sufficient number of
lawyers to meet this increased demand, although he did assert that the legal
community is sufficiently large to meet the demand."s In terms of numbers
alone, Douglas is correct in this assertion."3 However, as Mr. Justice Powell
pointed out, many of the potentially available lawyers have not practiced
criminal law, and are not dispersed in the hundreds of places in which counsel
may be required.84 There are, however, several ways in which the supply of
lawyers can be made more available.'
indigent would probably be unable to pay any fine imposed, yet the non-indigent defendant,
tried for the same offense, would be forced to pay. 407 U.S. at 55.
The second method, judicial determination of imprisonable classes, does not require
case-by-case predetermination; nevertheless, it may be criticized on the ground that the de-
termination of what is criminal and what standards of punishment should apply is a legisla-
tive task. Mr. Justice Powell pointed out that "[iln creating categories of offenses which by
law are imprisonable, but for which (the judge] would not impose jail sentences, a judge
will be overruling de facto the legislative determination as to the appropriate range of pun-
ishment for the particular offense." 407 U.S. at 53.
",See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 55 (1967) [hereinafter referred to as THE
COURTS].1 In 1971, 350,000 persons were charged with felonies. An estimated 60% of these
persons, or 210,000, were indigent. See 1 L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN
CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS 8-9, 125 (1965); Wall Street Journal,
June 26, 1972, at 1, col. 1. Estimates of the number of non-traffic misdemeanor cases yearly
range from 4 to 5 million. 1965 F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, tables 18, 21, at 108-09,
112 (1965); 1 L. SILVERSTEIN, supra, at 123. Of these offenders, it is estimated that 1.25
million are indigent. Id. at 125. A full-time lawyer with the support of adequate investiga-
tive services could effectively represent between 150 and 200 felony defendants yearly, and
between 300 and 1,000 misdemeanor defendants, depending on the complexity of the cases.
THE COURTS 56; LEGAL AID AGENCY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ANNUAL REPORT
28-31 (1965). The number of lawyers estimated to be required and the cost of imple-
menting Argersinger are somewhat inflated, since a considerable number of jurisdictions
had extended the right to court-appointed counsel to the extent provided by Argersinger
before the decision was rendered.
8' 407 U.S. at 37 n.7.
" In 1970, there were 335,242 lawyers in the United States, 236,085 of whom were in
private practice. Between 2,500 and 5,000 of these lawyers accepted criminal defense "more
than occasionally." THE COURTS 57. See also U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1971, table 236, at 148 (92d ed. 1971).
34407 U.S. at 56-60.
' One method which could be employed to increase the availability of counsel for in-
digent defense would be to improve the assigned counsel system, which is presently used ex-
clusively in about 2,750 of the 3,100 counties in the U.S. THE COURTS 59. The states could
make more extensive use of law students in the indigent defense system, as suggested by Mr.
Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in Argersinger. 407 U.S. at 40-41. The public de-
fense system could be expanded into jurisdictions in which its use would be most effective.
The basic problem raised by Argersinger is not the number of lawyers re-
quired or their availability for indigent defense, but rather the cost of creating
and implementing indigent defense systems." The total cost of defending, by
an appointed counsel system, all indigent felony and non-traffic misdemeanor
defendants would be from $94 million to $104.5 million annually." With a
public defender system, the annual cost would be between $52.5 million and
$67 million. " Although the public defender system would cost less to ad-
minister nation-wide, in jurisdictions where the number of indigent cases is
small, court-appointed counsel may prove less costly. In jurisdictions where
the number of indigent defendants is relatively large, the public defender
system would be less expensive to operate, since it could be used at near
maximum efficiency. But even if the optimum combination of public defender
and court-appointed systems is reached, there will be a considerable increase
in the cost of indigent defense, by virtue of the increase in the number of
persons who will now qualify under ArgersingerY
In light of the problems inherent in exclusive judicial implementation of
the new standard,' states which have not already extended the right to counsel
to the extent provided by Argersinger can accomplish the Court's dictates by
one of two main alternatives. One alternative would be to switch to a state-
wide system of public defense, perhaps retaining some degree of appointed
counsel in areas where indigent defense arises only occasionally. The states
could also try to reduce the number of eligible indigent defendants by elimi-
nating the possibility of imprisonment for certain misdemeanor and petty
offenses. Many states are beginning to do both.'
IV. CONCLUSION
Gideon had little practical impact, since counsel was already provided to
indigents in felony prosecutions in most states. In the same vein, the impact
of Argersinger may not be as great as expected, since a considerable number
of states had already extended the right to counsel to the extent provided by
the new standard.
See text accompanying note 38 infra. The scope of legal services provided by the Office of
Economic Opportunity could also be expanded. Comment, Unavailability of Lawyer's Services
for Low Income Persons, 4 VALPARAISO L. REV. 308 (1970).
'See, e.g., New Counsel Needed, 58 A.B.A.J. 942, 943 (1972).
" The average compensation for the defender of indigents under the appointed counsel
system is $150 to $200 per case for felonies and $50 per case for misdemeanors. THE COURTS
56; 1 L. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 31, at 125. The Criminal Justice Act of 1964 permits ap-
pointed counsel in federal courts to be compensated at an hourly rate not to exceed $15 for
in-court time and $10 for out-of-court time. Except in extraordinary circumstances, the max-
imum amount payable is $500 for defense in felony cases and $300 for defense of misde-
meanants. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1970).
38 It would require from 2,625 to 3,350 public defenders to provide defense for indigent
felony and non-traffic misdemeanor defendants. At an average salary of $20,000 each year
per defender, the cost would range between $52 million and $67 million annually. THE
COURTS 57; D. OAKES, A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT 12 (1968);
see Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 IOWA L. REV. 1248,
1263 (1970).
39 In 1969, the total expenditure by state and federal governments on indigent defense
was $78 million. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 33, table 236, at 148.
48 See note 29 supra.
41 Wall Street Journal, June 26, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
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The question remains whether the new standard established in Argersinger
is the logical and proper place to stop. In limiting the right to counsel to in-
stances in which the defendant would be imprisoned, the Court relied heavily
on the fact that imprisonment invariably has such a great effect on the
reputation and career of the defendant that the loss of liberty without having
had the assistance of counsel is not reflective of a fair trial. But the same type
of consequences may follow from penalties other than imprisonment.'
Whether the Court will extend the right to counsel beyond the Argersinger
standard cannot, of course, be determined at this point. Mr. Justice Powell,
however, stated that "the thrust of the Court's position indicates ...that
when the decision must be made, the rule will be extended to all petty offense
cases except perhaps the most minor traffic violations."' Should the Court
consider expanding the right to appointed counsel beyond Argersinger, con-
sideration should be given to the fact that the criminal justice system will
accomplish very little by promising more than it can provide.
R. Thomas Groves, Jr.
'See, e.g., James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325, 334-35 (5th Cir. 1969). The court sug-
gested that counsel should be appointed whenever moral turpitude attaches to the offense,
whether imprisonment is possible or not, because of the frequent non-legal consequences.
The court even suggested that losing a driver's license may be more serious to the offender
than a brief period of imprisonment.
11407 U.S. at 51.
[Vol. 27
